The Road to Hell: Racialized Paternalism and Political Behavior

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Abstract

Scholars of racial and ethnic politics have largely overlooked an important race-related disposition that strongly impacts salient policy preferences: racialized paternalism. This is a consequential and common disposition; rooted in a desire to improve outcomes for an out-group and a belief that the out-group is incapable of improving their own outcomes without interference. Importantly, I argue that this attitude is not motivated by animus. This leads these paternalists to endorse restrictive—albeit well-intentioned—policies imposed upon the out-group, which they hope will help the group overcome deficiencies. With data from the American National Elections Studies (ANES) and a pre-registered national survey, I assess the impact of this novel construct with a suitable proxy and a measure that I have developed, which I call Black Paternalism. I demonstrate that this disposition is associated with higher support for policies that are racialized and paternalistic, but not for policies that are merely racialized. Further with a survey experiment on state takeovers of local school boards, I demonstrate that racialized paternalism motivates significantly higher support for this policy when applied to a Black as opposed to a White school board.

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Introduction

In 1999 the Michigan state legislature disbanded the democratically elected school board in the city of Detroit and replaced it with members selected by the city's mayor and the state superintendent of education. The city, as a whole, and especially the schools had suffered from budget shortfalls for years, but the move to dissolve the school board was an extreme step, one used only in rare circumstances. Rarity notwithstanding, evidence suggests that incidences of state takeover are on the rise and there is a troubling pattern behind these interventions (Morel, 2017). To that point, the Detroit school board was not the only Michigan local governing body to find itself suddenly stripped of the power invested in them by the public. Three cities —Benton Harbor, Highland Park, and Flint— also lost their governing power to the state. These localities share one important demographic feature: they all have a plurality of Black citizens in a majority White state. Prior research on takeovers of elected governing bodies demonstrates that race plays a role in which bodies are targeted, even when accounting for other important factors like the financial situation or performance of these governmental entities (Morel, 2017). However, our understanding of racial attitudes and how they impact political outcomes does not provide a satisfactory explanation of this phenomenon.

The literature on race and political behavior often makes an explicit assumption that the main driver of racially biased and discriminatory outcomes is animus toward a particular out-group (Allport, 1978; Kinder & Sanders, 1996; Sears & Henry, 2003), but this need not be the case. The takeover of largely Black local governing bodies in Michigan provides an example where the animus approach might miss some crucial element of support. Prior work proposes that these takeovers are targeted towards African Americans disproportionately and are intended to reduce the political power of the group (Morel, 2017).[1] However, this explanation seems less convincing in the case of these Michigan cities (except for Flint), given that the takeovers were set in motion by the state's Democratic governor who benefitted immensely from Black political power in these localities, since Black voters and politicians were almost exclusively co-partisans. Importantly, these takeover efforts are quite frequently framed and justified as beneficial to the Black community. This is not to say that the elites who trot out this rationale are always being sincere and genuinely want what is best for African Americans; there is clear evidence that many elites do want to reduce the political power of out-groups (Rocha & Matsubyashi, 2013; Hicks, McKee, & Smith, 2016). But this framing may be successful in building a broad

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[1]Morel notes that these takeovers can under certain circumstances increase the political power of minorities, as was the case for the Latino community in Central Falls, Rhode Island. But his data on takeovers suggests this is much less likely to be the case for Black school districts.

coalition of support for these policies in the mass public, including among those who do not harbor ill will towards Blacks and are sincere in their desire to improve conditions for the group.

I argue that a crucial element of support for these takeovers[2], and several other important contemporary race-related policies, is a *racialized paternalism*. This is a group specific mass attitude, motivated by a desire to improve outcomes for an out-group and a belief that the out-group is incapable of improving their own outcomes without interference. Racialized paternalism is not rooted in animus; to the contrary, its adherents feel genuinely positive toward the out-group, but doubt the capacity of the out-group to handle its own affairs. The Flint case makes clear that, no matter the impetus behind the move, the loss of local control can lead to disastrous consequences. The city's state appointed manager approved a cost-cutting measure which made the Flint River the main source of water for the city. This new water source led to a large increase in the lead content of the city's water supply, poisoning thousands and killing at least 12.[3]

Extant scholarship on race and politics from across the social sciences has largely failed to account for racialized paternalism. From the definition of prejudice itself, to the large literature on modern and symbolic racism and even on to much of the more recent work on the impact of implicit racial attitudes; all of these efforts examine attitudes borne out of spite. This focus is warranted, given how many Americans still express an unmistakable hostility toward out-groups, and the clear connection between those feelings and discriminatory behavior (Tesler, 2012; Lajevardi & Oskooii, 2018). However, the story of racial attitudes and how they impact policy preferences certainly does not end with those who express animosity towards other racial groups. But virtually all common approaches to understanding the impact of attitudes about race on public opinion fail to explore the possibility that some of those who endorse discrimination may be spurred not by animus, but by their affinity for an out-group.

This theoretical construct is valuable for a number of reasons. First, it provides an explanation for why many Whites who express positive feelings toward Blacks as a group might still endorse policies that are harmful or discriminatory towards the group. This framework also provides intuition about when a crucial group of "moderates" is likely to side with racial conservatives (on policy that is racialized and paternalistic). Finally, this theory underlies the construction of a novel and consequential measure, the Black Paternalism scale. This measure is not easily conflated with partisan or ideological identities, an important critique often leveled against animus based racial attitudes like racial resent-

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[2]See Kang (2015) for evidence of this support

[3]https://www.reuters.com

ment (Carmines & Sniderman, 1997; Feldman & Huddy, 2005).

In this paper, I expound upon a theory of racialized paternalism and how it impacts political attitudes and behavior. I examine both a proxy and a direct measure of racialized paternalism towards Blacks in two separate studies. I validate the measurement strategies by demonstrating that both exert a considerable and robust impact on support for policies that are both racialized towards Blacks and paternalistic. Further, I demonstrate that these relationships persist above and beyond the impact of other relevant dispositions including racial resentment and authoritarianism. I also provide evidence of discriminant validity, demonstrating that the neither measure predicts support for racialized policies that are not paternalistic. I confirm in a pre-registered study that racialized paternalism is primed by race: the Black Paternalism scale is significantly associated with higher support for takeovers of Black school boards relative to White school boards.

Literature Review

Prioritization of Negative Affect as a Driver of Racial Attitudes

A key assumption made by scholars who have explored racial attitudes and how they motivate public opinion is that the valence of affect for a group will consistently drive preferences for policy toward that group in a consistent direction. This affect paradigm sees negative feelings toward an out-group as the natural precursor to discrimination and positive feelings toward a group as a precursor to positive intergroup outcomes (Clifford & Piston, 2017). For this reason, researchers interested in understanding the impact of racial attitudes on meaningful political outcomes have prioritized the role of racial animus as the primary motivator of discriminatory behavior. Allport, in one of the earliest attempts to reckon with this construct, defines prejudice as "antipathy based on faulty or inflexible generalization", making a negative affectual charge a necessary component of prejudice (Allport, 1979, p. 9). Much of the subsequent literature follows Allport's lead and prioritizes the role of negative affect as a necessary condition for prejudice.

The closely interwoven constructs of symbolic racism, modern racism, and racial resentment, have been the hallmark of political science work on how racial attitudes translate into political behavior over the past 40 years. Their creators have described the survey items in these various constructs as tapping into a "subtle hostility" and "a fusion of anti-Black affect and individualism" (Kinder & Sanders, 1996; Sears & Henry 2003). The questions were specifically designed to assess a dislike of African Americans paired with a belief that the group violates traditional norms. Other scholars have established that anger

is the emotional foundation of racial resentment, whereas old fashioned biological racism is motivated by disgust, both of which are negative emotions (Banks & Valentino, 2012). Similarly work on constructs like ethnocentrism, which has clear racial implications, has made use of differences in feeling thermometer ratings meant to capture negative views towards out-groups (Kam & Kinder, 2012).

Even scholars who have ventured beyond explicit measures have made use of implicit attitude tests that capture affective charges associated with specific out-groups (Kalmoe & Piston, 2013; Kinder & Ryan, 2015; Perez, 2016). The original IAT and many permutations focus on the immediate emotional charge following exposure to an out-group and assume that those who have more negative implicit associations with an out-group harbor an implicit bias against them (Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003). Though not all implicit measures are affect based the ones used most commonly to assess the impact of race bias, like the AMP or go-no go task, are (Pasek et. al. 2010; Nosek & Banaji, 2001).

A number of other approaches to examining racial attitudes have managed to avoid the dominant animus paradigm. Notably, Blumer's group conflict theory and variants thereof do not prioritize affect and focus on conflict over claim to material possessions, rights and resources (Blumer, 1958; Bobo & Hutchings, 1996). However, this conception still prioritizes explicit conflict, which is likely to co-occur with animosity (Jackman, 1994). Even important critiques of these approaches like that of Bonilla-Silva (1997), which notes the limitations of an understanding of racism rooted in mere interpersonal hostility, pushes scholars towards thinking about race as a structural phenomenon, instead of exploring the connection between neutral or positive affect for a group and racial bias.

Though the lion's share of attention has been paid to negative affect there have been efforts undertaken to explore the way that positive affect for out-groups impacts political behavior. However, this literature makes the same assumption and focuses exclusively on how positive affect and racial sympathy for an out-group are influential in driving attitudes on racialized policy (Katz & Hass, 1988; Chudy, 2017). These authors take the positive affect as a signal of genuine racial liberalism and do not seem to question the ways this positive affect might be complicated by other attitudes.

Stereotype Content Model and Paternalism

Despite the inattention from scholars of race and politics, there is reason to believe that the counterintuitive pairing of positive affect and racial prejudice can be found under the right circumstances. The stereotype content model from psychology posits that judgments about social groups fall along two key axes, competence and warmth (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick

& Xu, 2002). Though most of the work on racial attitudes looks at the congruent pairings, i.e. low competence/warmth and high competence/warmth, there are other possible combinations that can produce unique and consequential emotions toward out-groups. Specifically, groups that are seen as high in warmth and low in competence can engender emotions such as pity or sympathy (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick & Xu, 2002). Fiske and her colleagues find that several groups, such as the elderly, poor, or disabled persons meet this criterion. As such they are commonly seen as incompetent despite the fact that these groups are still viewed with warm affect overall. It is possible that many individuals feel similarly about specific out-groups.

And indeed, subsequent work demonstrates that the pairing of positive affect and negative stereotypes towards women is common and meaningful for gender relations. These scholars coined the term benevolent sexism to describe a type of sexism that is not driven by negative affect or independent of affect all together, but instead is driven by positive affect (Glick & Fiske, 1996). The concept describes men (and notably many women as well) who feel positively toward women and seek to help them, but still harbor negative stereotypes about the group and desire for them to fill predetermined roles that undercut these efforts. Glick and Fiske (1996) note that there are multiple important sources of benevolent sexism but the most relevant for these purposes is protective paternalism. The construct has been validated, is common among representative samples of the public and research has shown that it can motivate support for outcomes that are actively harmful for women (Glick & Fiske, 2001; Viki, Abrams & Masser, 2004; Dardenne, Dumont & Bollier, 2007). There has been little to no exploration of the degree to which a similar disposition might exist with regard to racial attitudes.

Fiske and her colleagues note that the unique emotional charges of high warmth and low perceptions of competence for an out-group can lead to a paternalistic prejudice. Paternalism can mean different things in different circumstances but generally refers to the relationship between a parent and child, and specifically circumstances when this dynamic is foisted upon other situations. Dworkin (1972) specifically defines paternalism as "the interference with a person's liberty of action justified by reasons referring exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests, or values of the person being coerced" (p. 61). Scholars of political theory, philosophy and law have taken time to explore the degree to which interference with one's personal liberty is appropriate and, as such, have had to tackle questions of when such paternalism is warranted in governance and when it is not (Mill, 1857; Arneson, 1980; Sanikowski, 1985; New, 1999; Sunstein & Thaler, 2003). However, scholars of American political behavior have largely ignored paternalism as a general disposition, individual variation therein, and the way the disposition may be influenced

or complicated by race.

Paternalism, Race and Politics

That said, some scholars of American politics more generally have found considerable evidence that paternalism is a potent force in American politics. This work is almost exclusively focused on the elite level, and not how this paternalism plays out among the mass public (Scott, 1998; Wacquant, 2009; Murakawa, 2014; Dionne, 2017). For example, Jackman (1994) explores the possibility that scholars of gender, class and race have, in their pursuit of outright conflict in intergroup relations, missed the dominant framework that superordinate groups have attempted to impose on their subordinates. She argues that paternalism is an ideology in the Marxist sense, one used to satiate subaltern groups and improve relations generally with these groups. In turn, these improved relations help to facilitate the exploitation and expropriation of resources from minorities to the dominant group (Jackman, 1994). Jackman claims that outright conflict between groups is rare and relations rife with conditional benevolence are a more sustainable strategy. She claims the goal of this paternalism is to reify the status quo and avoid costly and potentially successful challenges to the hierarchy, and that the benevolence often ascribed to the pater is an illusion. However, Jackman stops short of conceptualizing and measuring the disposition in the broader public, and assumes its existence from support of paternalist policy (1994).

Soss, Fording and Schram (2011) explore the rise of neoliberalism in the United States specifically with regard to poverty governance and find that race and paternalism are uniquely intertwined in how this has been implemented. Mead (1997) argued that the late 20th and early 21st centuries in American politics have featured a "new paternalism", referring specifically to efforts to reduce poverty through "directive and supervisory" policy. This project led to many reforms of government anti-poverty efforts, such as the end of AFDC and the introduction of work requirements for those receiving TANF. Soss, Fording and Schram (2011) claim this project is intended to remake the poor into ideal citizens, curing pathologies and teaching them to be self-regulating, and that the project is highly racialized. The relevant stereotypes about the laziness of the poor that these interventions are meant to correct are often targeted towards African Americans. The racial classification model posited by Soss, Fording and Schram (2008) makes clear that the paternalism is an intentional choice by policy makers, and they provide evidence that the racial makeup of a particular locality strongly impacts whether paternalism will be evidenced in policy choices.

To be sure, there is some scholarly work on the way that paternalism plays out among

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the mass public. Baker (2014) used a survey experiment to demonstrate that support for foreign aid to African countries was highly conditional on whether Western institutions were in place to oversee the use of funds. This work is an important contribution to the connection between race and paternalism, but still fails to measure paternalism as an individual level attitude. More problematically, this work explicitly claims that racialized paternalism does not operate in American domestic politics (Baker, 2014). Baker claims "mass attitudes about race and redistribution still show sentiments of uncharitable resentment, rather than charitable pity, to dominate among American whites" (p.96). The previously cited work troubles this notion, and I aim to do so further with the following theoretical account.

Theory

Racialized Paternalism

Given the differing conceptions of paternalism, it is necessary to first take some time to explain exactly what I mean by paternalism before addressing how it intersects with racial attitudes. For these purposes, I am only considering what is deemed as "hard" or "coercive" paternalism (Dworkin, 1972). As such, paternalism must include an attempt to limit the choices or access to goods and services, of an individual or group, and a justification of this action as somehow beneficial to the individual or group. Under this definition, a campaign aimed at educating sex workers about potential dangers of their profession would not be paternalistic, because, despite the assumption that sex workers do not understand the job they undertake daily, there is no effort to limit their freedom. However, the SESTA bill passed by Congress in 2018 which effectively shut down websites used by sex workers to sell their services, with the stated goal of ensuring the safety of sex workers, would be paternalistic. This is because concrete steps are taken to limit the access and choice in order to protect these same individuals.

Paternalism should be inversely related to dispositions like individualism which venerate the power of the individual to make their own choices. It may be closely related to authoritarianism, in that both of these constructs lead to support for state intrusion into the lives of citizens. Despite this, the motivations behind these constructs are notably distinct; the paternalist does not crave government interference exclusively for order or social control, as authoritarians do (Altemeyer, 1981). Instead the paternalist desires government interference in order to improve outcomes, driven by their judgments about the inability of their fellow citizens to succeed if left to their own devices.

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Paternalism has marred relations between dominant and subordinate groups in the United States at various times since the nation's inception. Though chattel slavery in the U.S. stands out for its brutality and dehumanization, slavery proponents rarely noted this aspect of the practice when arguing for its continuance. Indeed, many enslavers and slavery sympathizers made the case that slave owners were engaged in the task of civilizing their human property (Ford, 2009; Genovese, 1976). In the post-Reconstruction South similar arguments emerged to explain why Blacks ability to vote would be a fate worse than the reign of racial terror instituted in the wake of federal troop withdrawal (Smith, 1993; De Bow's Review, 1867). Many arguments along these same lines were made with regard to indigenous peoples in North America who, well into the 20th century, were forced to attend schools like Carlisle Indian Industrial School, alma mater of famed Sac and Fox Nation member and Olympic gold medalist, Jim Thorpe. These schools were founded with federal government authority with the express purpose of assimilating indigenous children into American culture which involved forcibly removing all artifacts of these children's own culture even down to their names (Trennert, 1982; Navarro-Rivera, 2006; Dawson, 2012). Indeed, even today indigenous Americans in the U.S. are officially designated as "domestic dependent nations", and maintain limited autonomy over their affairs and governance. These paternalistic approaches seemed to be targeted with surgical precision towards those at intersections of race, gender, and class. Countless women, especially Black and Brown women, were targets of forced sterilization at the hands of the state well into the second half of the 20th century. These actions again were justified in the context of eugenics with paternalistic appeals claiming to spare these allegedly morally unsound or incompetent women the hassle of child birth and care (Roberts, 1997; Beal, 2008; Kluchin, 2011). Each of these cases involves dominant groups limiting the freedom of out-groups, while claiming to do so in the groups best interest, with little regard for the perspective of group members, who are competent adults capable of articulating their own self-interest. And all of these efforts were incredibly harmful to those on the subordinate side.

These actions were not driven by a general or non-specific paternalism, they singled out particular identities and stripped them of agency afforded to other Americans. I build on the prior work suggesting paternalism among elites is an illusion, and masks strategic motivations (Jackman, 1994; Wacquant, 2009; Soss, Fording, & Schram 2012). Despite the insincerity from politicians and policymakers, I argue that within the broader mass public these rationales can find sympathetic audiences who harbor no ill will towards these outgroups, and genuinely desire to aid the out-group. The illusion of benevolence among elites that Jackman (1994) claims is a facade for those on the subordinate side of inequality, can also serve to convince superordinate group members who subscribe to a *racialized*

paternalism. This racialized paternalism has two simple but key components: a desire to improve outcomes for a group and a belief that the group is incapable of improving their own outcomes without interference. Underlying this unique disposition is an affinity for a racialized group, in conjunction with negative stereotypes about the competence and intelligence of the group. Though completely separate from animus, this framework compels support for interventions that strip power and agency from said out-group.

Notably, though judgments about the comptence of an out-group are central to this construct, it is not just about the impact of negative stereotypes relevant to an out-group. I argue that the impact of these stereotypes changes when they are paired with a genuine desire to help the stereotyped group. Stereotypes about competence and intelligence should be most likely to motivate racialized paternalism, but other stereotypes such as those concerning commitment to the work ethic or propensity for violence among a group should also contribute to this construct. Given the relevancee of stereotypes here, those at the nexus of several stigmatized identities (such as class, gender, sexuality and disability) are most likely to be targeted by this paternalism. Though this theory is not specific to any particular identity group or nation, in this paper I focus mainly on how it manifests in American Whites with regards to Blacks.

The construct of racialized paternalism provides several important contributions to the study of intergroup attitudes broadly. First, it expands our understanding of these attitudes by probing beyond a simple like dislike paradigm that has guided much research in this area and exploring the complex and multifaceted nature of the emotions we feel toward out-groups (Clifford & Piston, 2017). In doing so it provides an explanation for public support of policies that are racially biased or discriminatory among the many majority group members who do not express outwardly negative views of racial out-groups.[4] This framework also clarifies when the adherents of this disposition, who can play a pivotal role in implementing the aforementioned discriminatory policies, will side with those who have more conservative attitudes on race. Specifically, racial paternalists will support discriminatory policy that restricts the freedom of the out-group, but only when this policy is seen as accounting for the group's shortcomings and improving the group's outcomes. Finally, the theory elucidated here underpins the logic of a novel measure of racialized paternalism towards Blacks, which I explain in the next section.

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[4]For instance, Soss Fording and Schram (2008) demonstrate considerable racial bias in the application of welfare restrictions like drug tests, but this policy is popular even among a majority of White Democrats (United Technologies/National Journal, 2013; Kaiser Family Foundation, 2017)

Measuring Paternalism

One way to tap racialized paternalism is to simply interact measures of its two core antecedents, positive affect for an out-group and endorsement of negative stereotypes for that same out-group. It's important to note that this is not a direct measure of racialized paternalism since it cannot assess the specific desire to interfere in the lives of the relevant out-group in order to achieve good outcomes. But the combination of these attitudes should make it more likely that an individual will endorse racialized paternalism. Thus, Whites who feel positively toward Blacks as a group but still believe that Blacks are relatively more likely to exhibit negative stereotypical traits, should be more likely to express racialized paternalism towards African Americans. Though it may seem like those who feel positively about the group are likely to not endorse stereotypes, work on the stereotype content model shows that people have little problem negatively stereotyping groups they feel positively towards (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). More importantly, affect and stereotype measures are relatively common on large survey data sets like the American National Election Study (Henceforth, ANES). I will refer to this as the AS (Affect and Stereotypes) measure.

A more direct strategy would involve creating a battery of questions to directly tap racialized paternalism. These questions should simply ask about an individual's preferred level of outside interference in the lives of private citizens from a certain group. However, these must be asked in a general fashion without specific mention of government so as not to be conflated with more ideologically aligned and affective responses to the mention of the role of government. But these questions should still capture a belief that the average member of the key out-group is often incapable of ensuring good outcomes for themselves and it is the responsibility of the government to correct for these deficiencies through policy. These questions also must be carefully crafted to avoid picking up automatic affective responses toward that out-group, or social desirability. For this reason, these questions must focus on the need for interference in the personal lives of the group and not the stereotypes that may lead to this belief. I construct a series of questions that meets this criterion specifically with reference to African Americans, I will refer to this as the Black Paternalism scale. I will delve further into the specific questions used later in this paper.

Racialized Paternalism and Political Behavior

There is an extensive literature that suggests that when holding certain policies in mind, considerations about the group that the policy is assumed to impact automatically come

to mind (Nelson & Kinder, 1996; Lodge & Taber, 2013, Perez, 2016). And there are a number of political issues in the American context that have been demonstrated to be highly racialized, and clearly linked to certain racial groups, such as welfare and crime (Gilens, 2009; Valentino, 1999; Hurwitz & Peffley, 2005; Filindra & Kaplan, 2016). When respondents are exposed to a racialized policy that restricts or limits the freedom of the target out-group and does so specifically in order to help that group, racial paternalists will be likely to support this policy. In some cases, this could be policy that is actually harmful and that these respondents might not want for themselves. Regardless, as long as a policy is racialized and it imposes restrictions or limits freedom to overcome deficiencies it should be appealing to racial paternalists.

There are a number of policies that meet this criterion. Given the racialization of welfare, interventions meant to improve the lives of welfare recipients should be popular among racial paternalists (Gilens, 2009; Desante, 2013). Policies that require drug tests or employment (e.g. workfare) for welfare recipients should be seen as necessary interventions to ensure that "deviant" Black welfare recipients are forced to improve the quality of their own lives. These policies were a large part of the welfare reform push in the US in the 1990's that has been repeatedly linked to paternalism (Wacquant, 2009; Soss, Fording, Schram, 2011). A measure of racial paternalism toward Blacks should be associated with support for these policies. In a similar manner several judges throughout the US have offered inmates reduced sentences in exchange for the inmates being sterilized [5]. The rationale offered by the judge in one such case, which mostly targeted Black inmates, directly points to paternalism as the impetus. "I hope to encourage them to take personal responsibility and give them a chance, when they do get out, to not to be burdened with children," Judge Sam Benningfield said of his decision. A measure of racialized paternalism towards Blacks should motivate support for policy initiatives along these lines, especially when the crime is clearly racialized (such as with the use of crack cocaine). Finally, marijuana use is also clearly racialized, African Americans are much more likely to go to prison for marijuana related offenses relative to their size of the population, despite the fact that they use drugs at a roughly similar rate as Whites (Wallace, Bachman, O'Malley, Schulenberg, Cooper & Johnston, 2003; McCabe, Morales, Cranford, Delva, McPherson & Boyd, 2007). Because of this racialization, racial paternalists should see marijuana prohibition as necessary to ensure that Blacks do not excessively use the drug and harm their productivity and cognitive functions with it.

Demonstrating that a measure of racialized paternalism is associated with support for these policies is not sufficient to prove that the theory underlying the measurement is

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[5]www.washingtonpost.comww.washingtonpost.com

correct. We could see that pattern even if the measure of racialized paternalism instead captured some hidden or unexpressed animus. To rule out that possibility I test whether these measures predict support for a policy that is racialized but not paternalistic. For instance, a policy like Obamacare has been demonstrated to be tied to racial attitudes, but only through its association with President Obama (Tesler, 2012). So, unlike racial resentment, a measure of racialized paternalism should be unassociated with opposition to Obamacare.[6] Similarly, support for the death penalty has been shown to be linked to racial attitudes in numerous studies (Peffley & Hurwitz, 2002; Bobo & Johnson, 2004; Hurwitz & Peffley, 2005). However, given the clear mortal consequences of this policy, it should be seen as too extreme and punitive to be helpful to the out-group. As such, a measure of racialized paternalism should not be linked with such a policy.

Even if the expected behavior is borne out with regard to support for all of those specific policies, it is difficult to completely isolate the role of race by exploring cross-sectional data. In order to conclusively demonstrate that the race is the key driver of racialized paternalism, an experiment is necessary. Returning to the instructive Detroit schools example, takeovers of largely Black governmental entities have become an important tool used by state and federal authorities (Morel, 2018). From school districts to city administration to even mayors there is evidence that racial bias plays a role in when power is stripped from local governing bodies by their superiors (Morel, 2018). I argue that racialized paternalism plays a role here and stereotypes about even elites of the target out-group lead racial paternalists to believe that the group is not capable of self-governance. For this reason, a measure of racialized paternalism towards Blacks should predict *increased* support for government takeovers of largely Black local governing bodies relative to support for takeovers of largely White local governing bodies. This finding would provide concrete evidence that this disposition motivates racial discrimination. But since these racial paternalists are motivated by genuine benevolence, they should also be willing to take clear measures to help the out-group. As such they should also be relatively more supportive of increasing funding to a Black school board relative to a White one.

Hypotheses

1. Racialized paternalism, as measured by the AS proxy and the Black Paternalism scale, should predict support for policies that are: a) racialized with regard to the key out-group, and b) impose some restriction/limit on freedom/behavior/or ac-

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[6]One could make a case that Obamacare is paternalistic, but regardless, if racialized paternalism is unrelated to opposition, this provides evidence that the disposition is not capturing simple animus since racial resentment and other measures of this strongly predict opposition to Obamacare

cess to goods and services. This includes things like marijuana legalization, work requirements and drug testing for welfare recipients, sterilization as a punishment for mothers who use crack cocaine while pregnant.

2. Racialized paternalism should not increase support for racialized policies that are not paternalistic.

3. Racialized paternalism should predict increased support for takeovers of local governing bodies that are largely composed of the target out-group, relative to that of the in-group.

4. Racialized paternalism should predict support for increasing funding for local governing bodies that are largely composed of the target out-group, relative to that of the in-group.

Study 1

Data & Methods

To test this set of propositions, I first turn to existing data sets that can provide data that feature the key outcomes and measures of interest. The 2012 and 2016 ANES meet this criterion. The ANES provides a high-quality national probability sample, with each year featuring north of 3,000 respondents. I am interested exclusively in how members of the dominant group's attitudes are shaped by racialized paternalism so I restrict the sample to those who identify as White. I examine the face to face and internet samples combined in both years.[7]

These data allow me to construct the AS racialized paternalism proxy measure toward African Americans because feeling thermometer ratings and stereotype traits are included for both Whites and Blacks in 2012 and 2016. In 2012, these stereotype traits were intelligence and work ethic, in 2016, it was work ethic and violence. I am able to test the first hypothesis, that the AS proxy measure should significantly increase opposition to racialized and paternalistic policies, since support for one such policy, marijuana legalization, is measured in both years. I can also test the second hypothesis since other racialized policies, support for Obamacare and the death penalty, are also captured in both years.

To combine the two constituent elements into the AS racialized paternalism proxy, I first take the feeling thermometer for blacks and censor the measure so only those who

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[7]This can induce bias but I find similar results when these samples are disaggregated. These results are included in the appendix.

rate Blacks above the midpoint (50) are captured. I also take the difference in stereotype ratings for Blacks and Whites and also censor this measure so only those who rate Whites higher than Blacks on the combined stereotype measures are captured[8]. I then interact the above the midpoint feeling thermometer scores and the negative stereotype ratings to attain a multiplicative measure that should effectively capture the concept of racialized paternalism[9].

In the following models, I control for sociodemographic variables like age, gender, income, education, party ID, ideology, church attendance, racial resentment and authoritarianism, all normalized from 0-1. For the marijuana legalization question, the answer responses are favor, oppose or neither favor nor oppose. I preserve this ordering but recode the varibale between 0-1 with 1 corresponding to favoring legal pot. I use an ordered probit model to estimate support for this policy given the three category ordered outcome. For the other two dependent variables responses were Likert style 7-point favor/oppose, so I preserve the ordering and normalize these from 0-1. I model support for these outcomes with an ordered probit model as well.

Results

The first thing to explore with these data is how much of the sample is captured by the AS proxy measure of racialized paternalism. Again, the measure captures anyone who endorses the counterintuitive pairing of positive affect for Blacks and negative stereotypes for Blacks (relative to Whites). In 2012, 34% of the White sample is captured by the AS measure and in 2016, 37% of the sample is captured by the AS measure. This represents over a third of Whites, certainly not a trivial portion of the sample. Figures 1 and 2 demonstrate this by plotting the difference in stereotype measures for Blacks and Whites (X axis) and feeling thermometer ratings for African Americans (Y axis) in each of these samples. The highlighted regions in both plots encompass all who are above the mean for the feeling thermometer but still harbor negative stereotypes about Blacks, i.e. those captures by the AS proxy measure.

Notably, of those respondents who rate Blacks above 50 on the feeling thermometer, a majority across both data sets also endorses negative stereotypes about the group relative

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[8]I use a comparative measure for stereotypes because it is important for Whites to believe that Blacks *uniquely* embody these stereotypes in order for them to single out that group for interventions. For affect, an absolute measure is more appropriate since Whites need not like Blacks more than they like their in-group in order to feel positively toward the group and attempt to improve their situation

[9]The findings are substantively similar when using an indicator for those who lack negative affect and endorse negative stereotypes instead of the multiplicative measure. Models with this specification are included in the appendix

to Whites. So, though the pairing of positive affect and negative stereotypes is counter-intuitive, it is certainly not uncommon. Who are these Whites captured by the AS proxy measure and how do they differ from the rest of the sample? They are younger, more conservative and more religious than the rest of the respondents in both samples. In 2012 they are also more likely to be female, and in 2016 they are more likely to be Republican though neither of these patterns is found in the other sample.

Figure 1: Racial Paternalism 2012 ANES

Figure 2: Racial Paternalism 2016 ANES

Over a third of the Whites in both samples express attitudes consistent with the AS

proxy measure of racialized paternalism, but does it have the expected impact on policy attitudes? To answer that question, I first turn to the models included in Table 1. Again, both models are ordered probit and predict support for marijuana legalization among Whites. The first column features the model for the 2012 ANES and the second column features the model for the 2016 ANES. The key independent variables are the censored Black-White stereotype difference measure (Stereotype Difference (-)) and the censored Black feeling thermometer measure (Black FT (+)). These two are interacted to create the AS racialized paternalism proxy measure (SD*BFT). In the first model the key interaction is negative and significant (p<.01), indicating that those highest in positive affect for Blacks and negative stereotypes for Blacks relative to Whites are more likely to oppose marijuana legalization as expected. In the second model, though not reaching conventional levels of significance (p=.08), the coefficient is also in the expected direction.

Coefficients from probit models and especially those for interaction terms are difficult to interpret on their own. In order to further shed light on the effects detected in these models I turn to marginal effects plots. These are displayed in Figure 3 and Figure 4 which are derived from the models in 2012 and 2016 respectively. Each figure displays the marginal effect of affect for Blacks (Black FT(+)) on support for legal pot as negative stereotypes for Blacks relative to Whites (Stereotype Difference (-)) increases. In Figure 3 as stereotype difference increases, affect for Black predicts increasing opposition to legalized marijuana. To put this in context, moving from the midpoint to the maximum value of affect for Blacks leads to 7 percentage point drop in the probability of supporting legalized marijuana in 2012. Figure 4 shows much of the same, as stereotype difference increases, affect for Black predicts increasing opposition to legalized marijuana. Moving from the midpoint to the maximum value of affect for Blacks leads to 5 percentage point drop in the probability of supporting legalized marijuana in 2016. These results provide some evidence in support of the first hypothesis.

Given that the proxy measure seems to move support for marijuana legislation in the expected direction I turn to the merely racialized policy outcomes that are not paternalistic. Again, if the AS proxy measure is capturing something wholly separate from the animus based racial attitudes, it should not be related to support for policy items that are racialized but not paternalistic. I test this contention in the models in Table 2. Here each of the first two models predicts support for the death penalty and the third and fourth models predict support for Obamacare, all with ordered probit models. The first and third models are derived from the 2012 ANES data while the second and fourth are derived from the 2016 ANES models. Again, the key independent variable is the AS proxy measure for racialized paternalism (SD*BFT). In the first two columns, there is no significant

Table 1: ANES Models For Racialized and Paternalistic Policy

	Dependent variable:	
	Legal Pot	
	ANES 2012	ANES 2016
Age	−0.695***	−1.095***
	(0.104)	(0.094)
Male	0.144***	0.147***
	(0.039)	(0.046)
Education	−0.080	−0.033
	(0.106)	(0.092)
Income	−0.022	−0.158*
	(0.079)	(0.086)
Ideology	1.603***	−1.357***
	(0.109)	(0.116)
PID	0.140**	0.122
	(0.061)	(0.187)
Church	−0.537***	−0.738***
	(0.057)	(0.061)
Authoritarianism	−0.441***	−0.407***
	(0.069)	(0.084)
Racial Resentment	0.333***	0.005
	(0.126)	(0.110)
Stereotype Difference (-)	−0.202	0.481***
	(0.126)	(0.143)
Black FT (+)	−0.004	0.279***
	(0.074)	(0.085)
SD*BFT	−0.661*	−0.932***
	(0.387)	(0.357)
Observations	3,548	2,913

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Figure 3: Marginal Effect of Black FT (+)

ANES 2012

Figure 4: Marginal Effect of Black FT (+)
ANES 2016

impact of the AS proxy measure in 2012 or 2016 (p=.71, and p=.86 respectively). In the third and fourth model the same is true for the proxy measure with regard to predicting support for Obamacare. In both samples, the coefficient is not significantly associated with opposition to Obamacare (p=.23 and p=.89, respectively). These findings provide strong evidence in favor of the second hypothesis.

Taken all together the results from this study provide some promising evidence in support of the racialized paternalism theory. Though using an indirect proxy measure, I find evidence that over a third of the public holds views that align with racialized paternalism. This proxy also seems to predict opposition to marijuana legalization in both samples, although not reaching conventional significance in 2016. Further, there is evidence of discriminant validity: this measure does not predict support for measures that are racialized but not paternalistic. This suggests that this measurement strategy is not simply exploiting the impact of negative stereotypes, and is not driven by some hidden or unexpressed animus.

Study 2

Data & Methods

The high quality nationally representative survey data does provide some clear preliminary evidence that racialized paternalism is a common disposition that has a considerable impact on at least one relevant political attitude even when accounting for other sociopolitical attitudes. But there are a number of racialized paternalistic policies that do not

Table 2: ANES Models For Racialized Policies

	Dependent variable:			
	Death Penalty		Obamacare	
	2012	2016	2012	2016
Age	0.164	0.105	−0.028	0.486***
	(0.103)	(0.094)	(0.096)	(0.085)
Male	0.021	0.044	−0.024	−0.023
	(0.039)	(0.046)	(0.036)	(0.042)
Education	−0.078	−0.267***	−0.115	−0.227***
	(0.108)	(0.093)	(0.097)	(0.084)
Income	0.102	0.188**	0.220***	0.044
	(0.079)	(0.087)	(0.073)	(0.078)
Ideology	−0.376***	0.848***	2.110***	−2.430***
	(0.108)	(0.118)	(0.102)	(0.111)
Party ID	−0.134**	−0.177	0.845***	−0.195
	(0.062)	(0.203)	(0.056)	(0.171)
Church	−0.382***	−0.343***	−0.049	0.106*
	(0.058)	(0.064)	(0.053)	(0.057)
Authoritarianism	0.683***	0.492***	0.004	0.014
	(0.070)	(0.086)	(0.064)	(0.077)
Racial Resentment	1.762***	1.336***	−1.569***	−1.314***
	(0.125)	(0.112)	(0.116)	(0.101)
Stereotype Difference (-)	0.271**	0.606***	0.272**	−0.063
	(0.134)	(0.167)	(0.118)	(0.135)
Black FT (+)	0.002	−0.105	0.187***	0.059
	(0.072)	(0.082)	(0.068)	(0.076)
SD*BFT	−0.047	−0.438	−0.483	0.062
	(0.392)	(0.392)	(0.349)	(0.332)
Observations	3,845	2,913	3,845	2,913

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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appear on national survey data. The previous survey also did not allow me to directly measure racilaized paternalism toward blacks. To get a better sense of how these other factors are operating I fielded a survey through Turk Prime on July 17-18, 2019. The survey was restricted to Whites who were a part of the Turk Prime panel. 1800 respondents completed the survey, though 44 were dropped for incomplete or implausible responses. The demographics of the MTurk sample are distinct from that of the nationally representative sample. This MTurk sample was more female, younger, significantly more liberal, and less educated than the respondents to the ANES and relative to the demographics of the country as a whole. Though not representative, a body of reesearch has found that MTurk samples are still valid and can uncover similar effects as representative samples (Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012; Huff & Tingley, 2015). The survey also took around 10 minutes to complete and participants were again paid $1.50 for their time. The survey was preregistered on OSF Framework.[10]

To assess racialized paternalism in this survey I constructed the Black Paternalism scale. I began by adapting a general paternalism scale used in other parts of the dissertation project, intended to tap a non-racialized general preference for paternalism, and making these questions specific to African Americans.[11] I adapt these to ensure they would make sense and tap the key attitudes in question. I intentionally tried to craft questions where the socially desirable answer was not immediately clear, by asking about helping Blacks even if this could result in negative consequences. After pretesting six potential items were identified as promising and employed as the measure on this survey.

After examining all six items I dropped two of the questions and combine the remaining four items into a scale. The two dropped questions had heavily skewed distributions, very few respondents answered either of the questions in the affirmative. [12]The alpha for the scale improved from .68 to .75 when these items were dropped. Principal component analysis confirms that those two questions load heavily onto a separate factor from the other four questions.

The survey first asked respondents about their demographic information. After this, respondents answered a battery of questions about their racial and sociopolitical attitudes that included measures of stereotypes and feeling thermometers, the child rearing author-

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[10]The preregistration plan can be found here: https://osf.io/uy7gv/

[11]Pre-testing demonstrated that including both of these measure on the same instrument significantly altered responses, so the general paternalism scale was excluded from this survey

[12]The dropped questions were "How often should Black people be allowed to make mistakes without someone stopping them?" and "How often should Black people be kept from doing risky or harmful things that would have negative consequences for their lives?". this may have something to do with the "how often" structure of these questions, which was intended to reduce the possibility of acquiescence bias, but may have confused respondents to some degree.

itarianism scale, racial resentment and the Black Paternalism scale.[13] After this, respondents read a fictional news article they were told was randomly selected from list of local news stories.

The news articles specifically discussed a local school board that was underperforming. In each article, the Governor of the unnamed state is quoted and advocates for a state takeover of the democratically elected school board. A member of the school board is also quoted in each article and opposes the takeover and argues that more funding for the school board is necessary to increase student achievement. There are three separate conditions and the only thing that changes in these conditions is the race of the majority of the school board and of the students who attend the schools. In the first condition, it is majority White and White students are pictured, in the second condition it is majority Black and Black students are picture and in the final, condition the race is not stated and no students are pictured.[14] After they finish reading the article the respondents are asked what race the majority of the school board was, whether they support increased funding to the school board and whether they support a government takeover of the school.

Finally, respondents are asked a number of policy questions, the majority of which are paternalistic in some fashion. For the purposes of this analysis I focus on six questions. The first four are all racialized policies that should be seen to impact African Americans more than other groups. These policy items were drug testing for food stamps/SNAP/EBT recipients, marijuana legalization, sterilization as a legal punishment for women found to have used crack cocaine while pregnant and workfare for recipients of government aid. The Black Paternalism scale should strongly predict support for these policies since they are both racialized and paternalistic. There final two policy items that are racialized but are not paternalistic, support for the death penalty and opposition to Obamacare. Again, racialized paternalism should be unrelated to these items since, despite being clearly tied to race, these policies are not paternalistic.

Results

I start exploring the data generated in Study 2 with the key independent variable, the Black Paternalism scale. Figure 5 displays the distribution of that scale. This includes the four remaining questions and has been normalized from 0-1. The distribution is skewed slightly to the left. The average respondent is at .42 out of 1 on the scale, and about 10% of respondents answered all four questions in a direction that indicated paternalism. Black

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[13]Question wording for all of these included in the appendix
[14]Stimuli also included in the appendix

Paternalism is higher among the more religious, less educated, and younger Whites in this sample.

Figure 5: Black Paternalism Distribution TurkPrime Sample

The psychometric properties of the Black Paternalism scale indicate that it exhibits internal reliability and is not unpopular. But how does it relate to the other variables included in the study? I examine this in Table 3. This table looks at pairwise correlations between the Black Paternalism scale and the proxy measure for racialized paternalism, AS, as well as racial resentment, authoritarianism, partisan identification and ideology. The correlation between Black Paternalism and AS is positive and significant, but quite meager at r=.08. This suggests that though the constructs may be weakly related they are unlikely to be capturing the same underlying construct. There are a number of reasons this may be the case. The Black Paternalism scale intentionally does not address stereotypes and instead focuses on the downstream consequences, namely intervention in the lives of African Americans. Stereotypes are key for the AS measure, so this could explain the lack of correlation. The correlation between racial resentment and Black Paternalism provides more evidence this might be the case. The correlation between these two is negative at r=-.20. This suggests this measurement is picking up some disposition that is clearly not driven by animus. The racial resentment scale is positively but weakly correlated with the AS measure, however at r=.12.

The Black Paternalism has a positive relationship with authoritarianism at r=.09. This is not surprising, though it is notable that AS proxy measure is unrelated to authoritarianism in this sample. More notably, the Black Paternalism scale is unrelated to ideology, but is negatively correlated with partisan identification. The ideology and partisan identification variables are coded such that strong conservatives and Republican identifiers

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are the highest value, so this means that Democrats are somewhat more likely to be high in Black Paternalism than Republicans. This is an intriguing result, but the correlation pales in comparison to that of racial resentment and partisan identification (r=.44). This demonstrates that the Black Paternalism scale is less easily conflated with partisanship and ideology than animus based racial attitude measures.

Table 3: Black Paternalism Scale Correlations

	BP	AS	RR	Auth	Party ID	Ideology
Black Paternalism		0.08**	−0.20***	0.09***	−0.10***	−0.03
AS	0.08**		0.12***	0.01	0.07**	0.10***
Racial Resentment	−0.20***	0.12***		0.30***	0.44***	0.48***
Authoritarianism	0.09***	0.01	0.30***		0.22***	0.26***
Party ID	−0.10***	0.07**	0.44***	0.22***		0.66***
Ideology	−0.03	0.10***	0.48***	0.26***	0.66***	

Note: Correlation table adjusts for multiple tests. ***$p < .001$; **$p < .01$; *$p < .05$.

In order to determine whether the Black Paternalism scale has the expected impact on policy attitudes, I look at a set of racialized and paternalistic policies. Table 4 contains a series of four ordered probit models predicting support for these racialized and paternalistic policies. All of the independent variables are again normalized from 0-1 to ensure comparability and the same is true of the outcomes, with 0 corresponding to strong opposition to the policy and 1 corresponding to strong support for the policy. Each model controls for the same demographic variables, for authoritarianism, racial resentment, and Black Paternalism. The first model predicts support for drug testing welfare recipients. Here Black Paternalism has the expected impact, and is highly significantly associated with support for drug testing welfare recipients (p<.001). In the second model, predicting support for workfare for those on government aid, the same is true. The Black Paternalism is again significantly associated with increased support for the policy (p<.001). The next policy is legal marijuana. Yet again, Black Paternalism is significantly associated with the policy (p=.03). The final policy included in the plot is sterilization for mothers who've been convicted of using crack cocaine while pregnant. And once again the Black Paternalism measure is significantly associated with support for the policy (p<.001). This provides considerable support for the first hypothesis. The association between Black Paternalism and these policies is quite strong, and seems to point to this measure tapping the theorized construct with a high level of accuracy. Notably, the Black Paternalism scale seems

to exhibit impacts at least on par with and occasionally exceeding that of racial resentment and authoritarianism. This evidence provides strong support for the first hypothesis.

Table 4: Turk Prime Models for Racialized and Paternalistic Policy Items

	Dependent variable:			
	Drug Tests	Workfare	Legal Pot	Sterilization
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Female	0.163***	0.006	−0.128**	−0.026
	(0.056)	(0.053)	(0.056)	(0.054)
Education	0.094	0.589***	−0.555***	−0.347**
	(0.165)	(0.156)	(0.163)	(0.160)
Ideology	0.603***	0.512***	−1.051***	0.472***
	(0.139)	(0.131)	(0.138)	(0.134)
PID	0.234***	0.267***	−0.125	0.079
	(0.078)	(0.074)	(0.077)	(0.076)
Pray	0.051	−0.069	−0.177**	−0.001
	(0.074)	(0.070)	(0.073)	(0.071)
Income	1.857***	1.842***	−0.512	−0.535
	(0.427)	(0.401)	(0.406)	(0.427)
Age	0.002	−0.002	−0.007***	−0.008***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Authoritarianism	0.304**	0.358***	−0.270**	0.674***
	(0.134)	(0.126)	(0.132)	(0.130)
Racial Resentment	2.103***	1.495***	−0.225	1.111***
	(0.153)	(0.143)	(0.148)	(0.146)
Black Paternalism	0.596***	0.665***	−0.232**	1.218***
	(0.108)	(0.102)	(0.106)	(0.105)
Observations	1,756	1,756	1,756	1,756
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

To further test the validity of the Black Paternalism scale I turn to a second set of ordered probit models in Table 5. The two models depicted in this table predict support for the racialized but not paternalistic outcomes. These feature the same independent variables as the preceding models. Again, the Black Paternalism measure should not be associated with support for these variables if it is indeed picking up on an attitude that is separate from the measures of animus that have long been shown to impact support for these policies. The first column predicts support for the death penalty. Here Black Paternalism seems to be unrelated to support for the death penalty (p=.75), as hypothesized. The second model predicts support for Obamacare. Here Black Paternalism does have a significant association with support for Obamacare (p<.001), but it is positive, increasing support for the policy. Animus based measures have been linked to opposition

to Obamacare so these findings provide strong support for the first hypothesis. It seems clear, especially when considering these results alongside the negative correlation with racial resentment, that the Black Paternalism scale is not capturing some latent or hidden animus. The evidence from this table is consistent with the second hypothesis.

Table 5: Turk Prime Models for Racialized Policy Items

	Dependent variable:	
	Obamacare	Death Penalty
	(1)	(2)
Female	0.052	−0.062
	(0.054)	(0.065)
Education	0.435***	−0.395**
	(0.158)	(0.193)
Ideology	−0.969***	0.813***
	(0.134)	(0.161)
PID	−0.578***	0.098
	(0.075)	(0.092)
Pray	0.027	−0.256***
	(0.071)	(0.087)
Income	1.068***	0.358
	(0.399)	(0.500)
Age	0.003	0.004*
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Authoritarianism	0.226*	0.255*
	(0.127)	(0.153)
Racial Resentment	−1.374***	1.566***
	(0.145)	(0.177)
Black Paternalism	0.846***	0.012
	(0.104)	(0.008)
Observations	1,756	1,756

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

But this pattern of results could be explained by another phenomenon. The Black Paternalism scale could be capturing a general form of paternalism, not one that is specifically targeted towards Blacks. The relationship between this measure and the racialized and paternalistic policy outcomes could be a result of some other consideration such as class that might be conflated with race. In order to test the centrality of race in driving the Black Paternalism scale I turn to the survey experiment.

Again, all respondents were, after completing the sociodemographic and race related measures, made to read one of three versions of an article about a governor contemplating

taking control of a (fictitious) school board due to poor results on standardized tests. The articles were identical in every way, except a brief mention of the race of the school board appeared in all but the control group, and the race was either Black or White.[15] After this, respondents were asked if they supported taking over the school board and if they supported increasing funding to the school board. If the Black Paternalism scale is capturing the attitude is tapping the racialized paternalism as theorized, it should predict support for the takeover and support for increasing funding to a Black school board relative to a White school board.

To explore the degree to which the Black Paternalism impacts attitudes towards the school board I run a series of ordered probit regression models. I focus only on the Black and White school boards here in order to directly estimate the difference between the two.[16] In these models, the DV is support for the takeover or for increasing funding. I run three models for each dependent variable, the first only includes an indicator for the Black school board treatment in order to estimate a main effect of race. The second also includes the Black Paternalism scale and an interaction with the Black treatment to estimate the way that race alters the impact of the Black Paternalism scale. The final model takes the independent variables from the second model and also adds both racial resentment and an interaction of racial resentment with the Black treatment. This allows for an estimation of the impact of the Black Paternalism scale net of a key animus based racial attitude.

Table 6 displays the three ordered probit models estimating support for the takeover. In the first column, the estimate for the main effect of race in the experiment is negative but does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance (p=.4), failing to provide evidence that support for the takeover in aggregate is driven by the race of the school district. However, the second model tells a much more interesting story. As expected, the interaction between the Black Paternalism scale and the Black school board treatment is positive and reaches conventional levels of statistical significance (p=.02), indicating that the Black Paternalism scale does predict higher support for a takeover of a Black school board than a White one. This provides strong evidence in support for the theory and the third hypothesis. But does this result stand even when considering the impact of animus based racial attitudes, long shown to predict discrimination? The final model takes on

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[15]A manipulation check showed that 69% of the sample correctly identified the race of the school board in the article they viewed. Respondents were much less likely to notice the White treatment (54%) than the Black (73%) or race unstated/control (76%). Around 36% of those in the White condition thought race was unstated. I do not condition on successful manipulation to avoid a number of biases (Montgomerey, Nyhan & Torres, 2018; Aronow, Baron, & Pinson, 2018)

[16]Models with all conditions included in the appendix

this question. Yet again, even net of the impact of racial resentment (p=.48), the interaction between Black Paternalism and the Black treatment is positive and significant (p=.04), indicating that the Black Paternalism scale still predict higher support for a takeover of a Black school board than a White one. Notably the main effect of Black Paternalism in both models and racial resentment in the final model is positive and significant (p>.001 for all), indicating that those highest in Black Paternalism are more likely to support the takeover when the school is White, albeit less so than when the school is black.

To put this in context, Figure 6 presents a set of plots that graphically represents the marginal effect of Black Paternalism across the treatments from the final model in Table 6 including racial resentment and it's interaction with the treatment. In this figure the red line represents the impact of Black Paternalism for those who saw the White school condition and the blue line represents the impact of Black Paternalism for those who saw the Black School condition, separately for each outcome in the ordered probit model. Going from the lowest to highest end of Black Paternalism leads to a .1 decrease in the probability of strongly opposing the takeover when the school board is White, but leads to a .2 downward shift when the school is Black. The same change leads to a .15 increase in the probability of strongly favoring the takeover when the school board is White, and about a .25 increase when the school is black. Though the Black Paternalism scale was not expected to shift attitudes for a White school board, the stronger findings for the Black school board are consistent with the hypothesized effect.

Table 6: Turk Prime Models Predicting Support for Takeover

	Dependent variable:		
	Takeover Support		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Black Treatment	−0.050	−0.281**	−0.198
	(0.061)	(0.116)	(0.188)
Black Paternalism		0.586***	0.713***
		(0.168)	(0.171)
Racial Resentment			0.739***
			(0.193)
Black*Black Paternalism		0.526**	0.495**
		(0.235)	(0.240)
Black*Racial Resentment			−0.184
			(0.282)
Observations	1,173	1,173	1,173
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 7 displays the same set of models predicting support for increasing funding for

Table 7: MTurk Model Predicting Support for Increased Funding

	Dependent variable:		
	Increased Funding Support		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Black	0.126**	0.030	0.432**
	(0.063)	(0.120)	(0.199)
Black Paternalism		0.917***	0.753***
		(0.175)	(0.179)
Racial Resentment			−1.202***
			(0.203)
Black*Black Paternalism		0.219	0.131
		(0.244)	(0.251)
Black*Racial Resentment			−0.705**
			(0.298)
Observations	1,173	1,173	1,173
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Figure 6

Figure 6: Predicted Probability of Takeover Support
Turk Prime Model 3 (w/ RR)

Figure 7

## Figure 7: Predicted Probability of Funding Support
Turk Prime Model 3 (including RR)

the school board. The first model, estimating the main effect of race on support, is positive and reaches conventional levels of statistical significance (p=.04). This is a surprising result. The second model displays the impact of the Black Paternalism scale, but the result here is also not expected. Despite the positive main effect of the Black Paternalism scale (p<.001), the interaction is positive but does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance (p=.5). My final hypothesis is inconsistent with this result. The last model in the figure displays much of the same. Consistent with the literature, the interaction of the Black school board treatment with racial resentment is negative and reaches conventional levels of statistical significance (p=.02), decreasing support for funding the Black school board. Here Figure 7 presents a set of plots that graphically represents the marginal effect of Black Paternalism across the treatments from the final model in Table 7 including racial resentment, illustrating this effect. The Black Paternalism Scale interaction is again positive but far from reaching conventional levels of statistical significance (p=.75). But the main effect of the Black Paternalism scale is consistently large in magnitude and positive, indicating that the measure does predict support for increasing funding to black schools, but not in a way that is distinguishable from the effect for a white school board. This finding could be due to ceiling effects, since those highest in the Black Paternalism were so

overwhelmingly in favor of increasing funding regardless of the race of the school board.

Conclusion

The two studies analyzed together provide substantial evidence consistent with the hypotheses, with a few important caveats. First, it is clear that a number of Whites are able to simultaneously lack clear negative affect for a group and still endorse stereotypes against that group. In both ANES samples over a third of Whites harbor this view. Even more importantly, it seems clear that for both the proxy and direct racialized paternalism measures exhibit construct validity and had the expected impact on support for racialized policy. The relationships here are quite strong and almost all meet stringent tests for statistical significance in new discoveries (Benjamin et al., 2018). Further, there is clear and consistent evidence of discriminant validity, neither measure is associated with support for racialized attitudes that are not paternalistic.

In maybe the most intriguing result, the experimental studies demonstrate clearly that racial paternalists are significantly more likely to endorse a takeover of a Black school district than a White school district. This is true even when accounting for the impact of racial resentment in a preregistered study. This is direct evidence that racial paternalism is triggered by policies targeting the key out-group, and provides even more solid evidence that the static policy association findings are not being driven by unobserved confounder such as class or hidden racial animus. These results are consistent with my argument that racial animus is not necessary for discrimination to occur, challenging an established consensus in the race and politics literature. That said, the experimental sample is not nationally representative, and the low correlations between the antecedent focused proxy measure (AS) and the direct measure (Black Paternalism scale) raises important questions.

There are some reasons to believe that the low correlation could be due to some form of social desirability. Due to space constraints, the respondents were given a number of questions on race so they may have guessed the survey was meant to tap racial attitudes and been less likely to be forthcoming about their beliefs. To this point, only about 11% of the MTurk sample expressed negative stereotypes and positive affect toward Blacks, significantly less than the ANES samples and even other MTurk samples I've conducted. The degree to which the Black Paternalism scale predicted support for the takeover regardless of race was unexpected and also calls into question how much the measure is capturing paternalism wholly independent of race. However, it's worth noting that racial resentment, an attitude unquestionably attached to racial concerns has the same impact, but the magnitude of the effect does not significantly vary by condition.

Another intriguing finding is the demographic makeup of those who fall into the racial paternalist category. Consistently the AS proxy measure seems picks up more conservative White respondents. Both the proxy and direct measures seemed to capture more religious and younger Whites. This provides an interesting contrast with the demographic features of those highest in a measure of general and race neutral paternalism, which is explored in depth in the larger dissertation project. The partisan/ideological difference also points to further challenges with regard to measuring the same underlying construct with the proxy and direct racialized paternalism measure. In the future, I would like to further explore the degree to which this disposition might have heterogeneous effects across the partisan and ideological spectrum. This is especially important for conservatives; whose ideological worldview is in many ways antithetical to paternalism.

It is also important to note that the theoretical story makes a key claim which I do not test in this manuscript. The argument rests on elites cynically deploying paternalism as a framing strategy in order to convince paternalists in the mass public to agree with them on policy. In the larger dissertation project, I provide some archival evidence that policy makers do intentionally use paternalism in their appeals for policy. I also plan to run a survey experiment testing the effectiveness of paternalistic framing in activating racialized paternalism (measured by the Black Paternalism scale) and making it even more predictive of policy attitudes. Though not direct evidence, I would argue that the patterns shown here with regard to policy attitudes are consistent with these considerations already being baked in to how Whites view these policies.

The findings presented in this paper suggest that scholars would do well to pay more attention to racial attitudes that are not rooted in animus. Racialized paternalism, despite the inattention from scholars, has a long history in the United States, and this work suggests it will continue to play a role in domestic politics. Martin Luther King Jr. famously wrote in his Letter from Birmingham Jail, "I have almost reached the regrettable conclusion that the Negro's great stumbling block in his stride toward freedom is not the White Citizen's Counciler or the Ku Klux Klanner, but the White moderate." Racial animus seems ascendant in post-Obama America and presents many normative challenges, including a clear and present threat to the livelihood of racial minorities. But it is well worth remembering that positive feelings and good intentions with regard to subordinate groups are not sufficient to avoid similarly dangerous outcomes.

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Appendix

Black Paternalism Scale

1. How important is it to improve conditions for black people even if doing so restricts their freedoms?

    - Extremely Important
    - Very important
    - Moderately important
    - Slightly important
    - Not at all important

2. How important is it for black people to have control over their lives, even if it results in them making poor decisions in their lives?

    - Extremely Important
    - Very important
    - Moderately important
    - Slightly important
    - Not at all important

3. (DROPPED) How often should black people be allowed to make mistakes without someone stopping them?

    - All the time
    - Very Often
    - Somewhat Often
    - Rarely
    - Never

4. (DROPPED) How often should black people be kept from doing risky or harmful things that would have negative consequences for their lives?

    - All the time
    - Very Often

- Somewhat Often

- Rarely

- Never

5. How important is it to prevent black people from making costly mistakes?

- Extremely Important

- Very important

- Moderately important

- Slightly important

- Not at all important

6. How important is it that black people get extra help to make it in today's society?

- Extremely Important

- Very important

- Moderately important

- Slightly important

- Not at all important

ANES 2012 & 2016 DV Question Wordings

- Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose the use of marijuana being legal?

  - Favor

  - Neither favor nor oppose

  - Oppose

- Do you FAVOR or OPPOSE the death penalty for persons convicted of murder?

  - Strongly favor

  - Favor

  - Don't know

  - Oppose

  - Strongly oppose

- Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose the health care reform law passed in 2010? This law requires all Americans to buy health insurance and requires health insurance companies to accept everyone.

    – Favor a great deal

    – Favor moderately

    – Favor a little

    – Don't know

    – Oppose a little

    – Oppose moderately

    – Oppose a great deal

TurkPrime DV Study Question Wordings

- Do you favor or oppose requiring recipients of government aid like EBT/food stamp benefits to work a full time job in order to receive said aid?Âă

    – Strongly favor

    – Favor

    – Somewhat favor

    – Neither favor nor oppose

    – Somewhat oppose

    – Oppose

    – Strongly oppose

- Do you favor or oppose allowing the legalization of marijuana?

    – Strongly favor

    – Favor

    – Somewhat favor

    – Neither favor nor oppose

    – Somewhat oppose

    – Oppose

- Strongly oppose

- Do you favor or oppose allowing judges to sentence a woman who is found to have used crack cocaine while pregnant to be sterilized or made infertile as a punishment for her crime?

    - Strongly favor

    - Favor

    - Somewhat favor

    - Neither favor nor oppose

    - Somewhat oppose

    - Oppose

    - Strongly oppose

- Do you favor or oppose requiring recipients of government aid like EBT/food stamps to pass a drug test in order to receive said aid?

    - Strongly favor

    - Favor

    - Somewhat favor

    - Neither favor nor oppose

    - Somewhat oppose

    - Oppose

    - Strongly oppose

- Do you favor or oppose the Affordable Care Act passed in 2010? This law requires all Americans to buy health insurance and requires health insurance companies to accept everyone.

    - Strongly favor

    - Favor

    - Somewhat favor

    - Neither favor nor oppose

    - Somewhat oppose

    - Oppose

- – Strongly oppose

- Do you favor or oppose the death penalty?

    - – Strongly favor

    - – Favor

    - – Somewhat favor

    - – Neither favor nor oppose

    - – Somewhat oppose

    - – Oppose

    - – Strongly oppose

Treatments

Figure 1: Black Treatment

Gov considering state takeover of FCPS

Springdale —State legislators are considering legislation that would disband the locally elected school board in Franklin County and allow the governor to appoint an emergency manager to administer the schools.

Despite being one of the most populous counties in the state, Franklin County Schools have performed worse than the state average in both standardized test scores and graduation rates. The county and the school board are largely African American.

In a sit-down interview with WLKY, Gov. Matt Simpson said he's interested in getting better results for students and believes a takeover is the only way this is possible. "The students in Franklin County are being underserved by their school board, it's time for the state to step in and right the ship," Simpson told WKLY reporters.

Franklin County school board members pointed out that the county has some of the best performing schools in the state -- and some of the worst -- noting the gap needs to be narrowed. But they believe more resources are necessary to improve performances. "There is certainly room for improvement, but there is no reason to start from scratch here. The real problem is the lack of investment by the state in these students," Paul Brown, an at-large school board member, told WLKY.

Legislators plan to vote on the proposal to disband the school board before the end of the current legislative session early next month. Stay tuned to WLKY for more updates on this story.

Figure 2: White Treatment

Gov considering state takeover of FCPS

Springdale — State legislators are considering legislation that would disband the locally elected school board in Franklin County and allow the governor to appoint an emergency manager to administer the schools.

Despite being one of the most populous counties in the state, Franklin County Schools have performed worse than the state average in both standardized test scores and graduation rates. The county and the school board are largely white.

In a sit-down interview with WLKY, Gov. Matt Simpson said he's interested in getting better results for students and believes a takeover is the only way this is possible. "The students in Franklin County are being underserved by their school board, it's time for the state to step in and right the ship," Simpson told WKLY reporters.

Franklin County school board members pointed out that the county has some of the best performing schools in the state -- and some of the worst -- noting the gap needs to be narrowed. But they believe more resources are necessary to improve performances. "There is certainly room for improvement, but there is no reason to start from scratch here. The real problem is the lack of investment by the state in these students," Paul Brown, an at-large school board member, told WLKY.

Legislators plan to vote on the proposal to disband the school board before the end of the current legislative session early next month. Stay tuned to WLKY for more updates on this story.

Figure 3: Neutral Treatment

Gov weighs in on possible state takeover of FCPS

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WLKY | Updated: 8:26 AM EDT May 14, 2018

Springdale — State legislators are considering legislation that would disband the locally elected school board in Franklin County and allow the governor to appoint an emergency manager to administer the schools.

Despite being one of the most populous counties in the state, Franklin County Schools have performed worse than the state average in both standardized test scores and graduation rates.

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Legislators plan to vote on the proposal to disband the school board before the end of the current legislative session early next month. Stay tuned to WLKY for more updates on this story.

Models Study 1 Disaggregated by Survey Mode

Table 8 features ordered probit models with the exact same specification as those from Table 1 and 2, but only features respondents who took the survey online. Table 9 presents the same for those who took the ANES with a live interviewer. Table 10 features ANES 2016 ordered probit models with the outcomes from those tables with only the internet sample. Table 11 features the same for ANES 2016 respondents who took the survey face to face.

Table 8: ANES 2012 Internet Sample

	Dependent variable:		
	Legal Pot	Obamacare	Death Penalty
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Age	−0.907***	0.178	−0.166
	(0.190)	(0.172)	(0.188)
Male	0.129*	−0.038	0.023
	(0.073)	(0.067)	(0.072)
Education	−0.074	0.227	−0.085
	(0.196)	(0.178)	(0.201)
Income	0.146	0.368***	0.070
	(0.150)	(0.137)	(0.148)
Ideology	1.456***	1.748***	−0.233
	(0.201)	(0.185)	(0.199)
Party ID	0.263**	0.916***	−0.335***
	(0.115)	(0.106)	(0.116)
Church	−0.533***	−0.056	−0.446***
	(0.103)	(0.095)	(0.104)
Authoritiarianism	−0.474***	−0.027	0.840***
	(0.132)	(0.121)	(0.133)
Racial Resentment	0.770***	−1.183***	1.400***
	(0.210)	(0.192)	(0.211)
Stereotype Difference (-)	−1.065***	0.772***	0.461*
	(0.233)	(0.207)	(0.251)
Black FT (+)	−0.027	0.221*	0.023
	(0.128)	(0.115)	(0.123)
SD*BFT	0.739	−1.052	1.332
	(0.748)	(0.664)	(0.810)
Constant	−0.694**	0.421***	0.694***
	(0.344)	(0.041)	(0.048)
Observations	1,178	1,178	1,178

Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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Table 9: ANES 2012 Face to Face Sample

	Dependent variable:		
	Legal Pot	Obamacare	Death Penalty
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Age	−0.907***	0.178	0.326***
	(0.190)	(0.172)	(0.124)
Male	0.129*	−0.038	0.015
	(0.073)	(0.067)	(0.047)
Education	−0.074	0.227	−0.054
	(0.196)	(0.178)	(0.128)
Income	0.146	0.368***	0.144
	(0.150)	(0.137)	(0.094)
Ideology	1.456***	1.748***	−0.463***
	(0.201)	(0.185)	(0.130)
Party ID	0.263**	0.916***	−0.041
	(0.115)	(0.106)	(0.073)
Church	−0.533***	−0.056	−0.359***
	(0.103)	(0.095)	(0.070)
Authoritarianism	−0.474***	−0.027	0.626***
	(0.132)	(0.121)	(0.082)
Racial Resentment	0.770***	−1.183***	1.953***
	(0.210)	(0.192)	(0.158)
Stereotype Difference (-)	−1.065***	0.772***	0.140
	(0.233)	(0.207)	(0.160)
Black FT (+)	−0.027	0.221*	−0.049
	(0.128)	(0.115)	(0.090)
SD*BFT	0.739	−1.052	−0.472
	(0.748)	(0.664)	(0.452)
Constant	−1.276**	0.214***	0.595***
	(0.505)	(0.082)	(0.091)
Observations	873	873	873
R^2		0.354	0.185
Adjusted R^2		0.344	0.173
Log Likelihood	−688.795		
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,403.589		

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 10: ANES 2016 Face to Face Sample

	Dependent variable:		
	Legal Pot	Death Penalty	Obamacare
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Age	−1.362***	0.112	0.208
	(0.175)	(0.170)	(0.154)
Male	0.324***	0.020	0.026
	(0.088)	(0.087)	(0.079)
Education	−0.011	−0.005	−0.235
	(0.173)	(0.173)	(0.155)
Income	−0.242	0.050	0.052
	(0.166)	(0.164)	(0.147)
Ideology	−1.096***	0.660***	−2.473***
	(0.214)	(0.212)	(0.203)
Party ID	0.057	−0.276	−0.098
	(0.212)	(0.233)	(0.190)
Church	−0.775***	−0.336***	0.029
	(0.114)	(0.117)	(0.105)
Racial Resentment	−0.202	1.504***	−1.210***
	(0.213)	(0.214)	(0.191)
Authoritarianism	−0.518***	0.315*	0.104
	(0.170)	(0.168)	(0.152)
Stereotype Difference (-)	0.428	0.388	−0.067
	(0.276)	(0.309)	(0.257)
Black FT(+)	0.020	−0.054	0.046
	(0.161)	(0.153)	(0.141)
BFT*SD	−1.190***	−0.443	0.826
	(0.457)	(0.727)	(0.627)
Observations	813	813	813

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 11: ANES 2016 Internet Sample

	Dependent variable:		
	Legal Pot	Death Penalty	Obamacare
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Age	−0.979***	0.095	0.612***
	(0.112)	(0.113)	(0.103)
Male	0.082	0.053	−0.046
	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.050)
Education	−0.009	−0.413***	−0.205**
	(0.109)	(0.112)	(0.101)
Income	−0.142	0.235**	0.054
	(0.101)	(0.103)	(0.093)
Ideology	−1.482***	0.951***	−2.424***
	(0.140)	(0.142)	(0.133)
Party ID	0.393	0.182	−0.374
	(0.434)	(0.437)	(0.391)
Church	−0.730***	−0.348***	0.122*
	(0.073)	(0.077)	(0.069)
Racial Resentment	0.098	1.260***	−1.357***
	(0.130)	(0.133)	(0.120)
Authoritarianism	−0.374***	0.555***	−0.027
	(0.097)	(0.100)	(0.090)
Stereotype Difference (-)	0.497***	0.672***	−0.035
	(0.168)	(0.199)	(0.160)
Black FT (+)	0.372***	−0.139	0.077
	(0.100)	(0.098)	(0.091)
BFT*SD	−1.044**	−0.429	−0.216
	(0.416)	(0.468)	(0.393)
Observations	2,100	2,100	2,100

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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Models Study 1 With Indicator AS Variable

Table 12 features the ordered probit models with ANES 2012 data from Table 2 and 3, except that the interaction used for the AS Measure has been replaced with an indicatopr variable. Anyone who rates Blacks over 50 on the feeling thermometer and endorses negative stereotypoes about Blacks relative to white is coded as 1 and all others are coded as 0. Table 13 features the same for the 2016 ANES.

Table 12: ANES 2012 Models with Indicator AS Measure

	Dependent variable:		
	Legal Pot	Death Penalty	Obamacare
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Age	−0.684***	0.155	−0.026
	(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.096)
Male	0.143***	0.026	−0.031
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.036)
Education	−0.079	−0.089	−0.120
	(0.106)	(0.107)	(0.097)
Income	−0.019	0.103	0.229***
	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.073)
Ideology	1.590***	−0.363***	2.125***
	(0.109)	(0.108)	(0.102)
PID	0.149**	−0.142**	0.843***
	(0.061)	(0.062)	(0.056)
Church	−0.528***	−0.395***	−0.041
	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.052)
Authoritarianism	−0.458***	0.699***	0.014
	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.064)
Racial Resentment	0.252**	1.848***	−1.534***
	(0.118)	(0.118)	(0.108)
AS Proxy Inidcator	−0.133***	0.064	0.011
	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.038)
Observations	3,845	3,845	3,845

| *Note:* | *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 |

	Dependent variable:		
	pot_legal	obc	dp
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Age	−0.971***	0.101	0.614***
	(0.112)	(0.113)	(0.103)
Male	0.062	0.063	−0.049
	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.050)
Education	−0.009	−0.405***	−0.207**
	(0.109)	(0.112)	(0.101)
Income	−0.134	0.233**	0.054
	(0.100)	(0.103)	(0.093)
Ideology	−1.497***	0.954***	−2.430***
	(0.140)	(0.142)	(0.133)
Party ID	0.472	0.208	−0.373
	(0.432)	(0.438)	(0.390)
Church	−0.709***	−0.365***	0.129*
	(0.072)	(0.076)	(0.069)
Racial Resentment	0.115	1.484***	−1.393***
	(0.121)	(0.124)	(0.112)
Authoritarianism	−0.373***	0.592***	−0.035
	(0.096)	(0.099)	(0.089)
AS Measure Indicator	−0.043	−0.0004	−0.037
	(0.055)	(0.057)	(0.051)
Observations	2,100	2,100	2,100

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Models for Study 2 Experiment, Full Sample

Tables 14 and 15 feature the exact same ordered probit models as Table 6 and 7 in the paper. But the models in 13 and 14 are run in the full sample including the controls, and not just those who saw a race treatment.

Table 14: Turk Prime Experiment Model Takeover Support, Full Sample

	Dependent variable:		
	Takeover Support		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Black Treatment	−0.002	−0.140	−0.155
	(0.053)	(0.101)	(0.167)
Black Paternalism		0.799***	0.893***
		(0.120)	(0.122)
Racial Resentment			0.508***
			(0.139)
Black*Black Paternalism		0.297	0.294
		(0.204)	(0.208)
Black*Racial Resentment			0.039
			(0.248)
Observations	1,756	1,756	1,756
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table 15: Turk Prime Experiment Model Funding Support, Full Sample

	Dependent variable:		
	Support for Increasing Funding		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Black Treatment	0.141**	0.039	0.579***
	(0.055)	(0.104)	(0.176)
Black Paternalism		0.919***	0.788***
		(0.124)	(0.127)
Racial Resentment			−0.875***
			(0.145)
Black*Black Paternalism		0.225	0.089
		(0.212)	(0.217)
Black:Racial Resentment			−1.017***
			(0.263)
Observations	1,756	1,756	1,756
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Models for Study 2 With AS Measure

Tables 16-19 feature the same DV's as models 5-8, with the MTurk data. But instead of the Black Paternalism scale the AS proxy measure is included.

Table 16: Models for Racialized and Paternalistic Policies Study 2 with AS Measure

	Dependent variable:			
	Drug Tests	Workfare	Legal Pot	Sterilization
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Female	0.027**	−0.003	−0.023*	−0.011
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Education	0.001	0.116***	−0.112***	−0.143***
	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.042)
Ideology	0.169***	0.136***	−0.256***	0.133***
	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.035)
PID	0.047**	0.058***	−0.036*	−0.001
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Pray	0.020	−0.004	−0.049***	0.024
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.019)
Income	0.404***	0.442***	−0.126	−0.066
	(0.097)	(0.094)	(0.100)	(0.106)
Age	0.0003	−0.001**	−0.002***	−0.003***
	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0005)
Authoritarianism	0.114***	0.119***	−0.072**	0.211***
	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.034)
Racial Resentment	0.432***	0.303***	−0.027	0.151***
	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.038)
Stereotype Difference (-)	−0.070	−0.048	0.010	0.103*
	(0.052)	(0.050)	(0.054)	(0.057)
Black FT(+)	0.023	0.014	0.022	−0.029
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.018)
BFT*SD	0.046**	0.040	0.027	−0.065*
	(0.023)	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.036)
Constant	0.284***	0.252***	0.965***	0.453***
	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.038)
Observations	1,756	1,756	1,756	1,756
R^2	0.259	0.194	0.145	0.125
Adjusted R^2	0.253	0.189	0.139	0.119

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 17: Models for Racialized Policies Study 2 with AS Measure

	Dependent variable:	
	Death Penalty	Obamacare
	(1)	(2)
Female	−0.012	0.001
	(0.013)	(0.015)
Education	−0.120***	0.154***
	(0.037)	(0.044)
Ideology	0.223***	−0.331***
	(0.030)	(0.036)
PID	0.074***	−0.225***
	(0.018)	(0.021)
Pray	−0.071***	0.029
	(0.017)	(0.020)
Income	−0.023	0.291***
	(0.094)	(0.112)
Age	0.001***	−0.001**
	(0.0004)	(0.0005)
Authoritarianism	0.162***	0.048
	(0.029)	(0.035)
SD	0.108**	−0.218***
	(0.050)	(0.059)
BFT	−0.017	0.018
	(0.016)	(0.019)
SD*BFT	0.100	0.348*
	(0.166)	(0.198)
Constant	0.484***	0.687***
	(0.033)	(0.040)
Observations	1,756	1,756
R^2	0.163	0.278
Adjusted R^2	0.158	0.273

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 18: Experiement Models Takeover Support Study 2, with AS Measure

	Dependent variable:	
	Takeover Support	
	(1)	(2)
Black Treatment	−0.008	0.023
	(0.018)	(0.038)
AS Measure	0.074**	0.056
	(0.037)	(0.037)
Racial Resentment		0.141***
		(0.051)
Black*AS Measure	−0.049	−0.038
	(0.053)	(0.054)
Black*Racial Resentment		−0.076
		(0.075)
Constant	0.503***	0.442***
	(0.012)	(0.025)
Observations	1,173	1,173
R^2	0.004	0.012
Adjusted R^2	0.002	0.008
Residual Std. Error	0.284 (df = 1169)	0.283 (df = 1167)
F Statistic	1.744 (df = 3; 1169)	2.849** (df = 5; 1167)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 19: Experiement Models Funding Support Study 2, with AS Measure

	Dependent variable:	
	Support for Increasing Funding	
	(1)	(2)
Black Treatment	0.022*	0.087***
	(0.013)	(0.026)
AS Measure	−0.037	−0.008
	(0.027)	(0.026)
Racial Resentment		−0.230***
		(0.036)
Black*AS Measure	0.013	0.025
	(0.039)	(0.038)
Black*Racial Resentment		−0.131**
		(0.053)
Constant	0.703***	0.802***
	(0.009)	(0.018)
Observations	1,173	1,173
R^2	0.006	0.104
Adjusted R^2	0.003	0.100
Residual Std. Error	0.209 (df = 1169)	0.198 (df = 1167)
F Statistic	2.180* (df = 3; 1169)	27.105*** (df = 5; 1167)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01